When baby Charlie Gard was diagnosed with a rare mitochondrial disease, his parents located a Professor of Neurology in the USA willing to provide nucleoside therapy which offered a theoretical chance of improvement and successfully raised £1.3 million through crowd funding. The decision that unproven therapy was contrary to Charlie Gard's best interests and that life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn was devastating for his parents and difficult for their supporters to comprehend. The decision was upheld at three levels of appeal and Charlie died in July 2017 aged 11 months. This commentary provides a critical analysis of the legal principles surrounding unproven treatment and application of the best interests test in the different contexts of hospital and court. It draws attention to conflicting guidance and explores differences in approach in relation to unproven treatment for adults lacking capacity and children.
INTRODUCTION
The judicial decision that it was in baby Charlie Gard's best interests for artificial ventilation to be withdrawn was devastating for his parents, Chris Gard and Connie Yates, and difficult for their supporters to fathom. Many found it incomprehensible that a treatment option proposed and funded by united parents that carries a chance, however small, of improving a child's future could be rejected. Interventions came from commentators across the globe, including the Pope, Donald Trump, and US Congress. The legal principles were all but lost in the debate. We will argue that they were compassionately and correctly applied.
Charlie Gard was born at full term on 4 August 2016. When he was a few weeks old, his parents grew worried about his development and he was admitted to Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH). He was found to have a rare genetic condition called infantile onset encephalomyopathic mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome referred to as MDDS. Mitochondrial disease results in a build-up of oxygen and fuel molecules in the cells which leads to progressive muscle weakness. Charlie also had congenital deafness and severe epilepsy disorder. No proven treatment exists for Charlie's condition, but there was a theoretical possibility that nucleoside therapy might improve Charlie's outlook. GOSH considered making a referral 1 but declined to do so when tests indicated that Charlie's brain had been severely affected by the disease, 2 in all likelihood reaching the stage of severe epileptic encephalopathy.
3 GOSH considered nucleoside therapy to be contrary to Charlie's best interests. The parents accepted that Charlie's quality of life was not worth sustaining if there was no prospect of improvement, but they believed nucleoside therapy offered hope, located a Professor of Neurology in the USA willing to provide it and successfully raised £1.3 million through crowd funding.
The dispute between GOSH and Chris Gard and Connie Yates could not be resolved through mediation and the matter was referred to Mr Justice Francis in the High Court. A guardian was appointed to represent Charlie. Four declarations were sought by GOSH: that Charlie lacked capacity, that it was in his best interests for artificial ventilation to be withdrawn, that palliative care should be administered and that it was not in his best interests to undergo nucleoside therapy. 4 Francis J granted the declarations and over the following months, his decision was upheld at three levels of appeal. 5 A stay of the High Court declaration permitting withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was issued until the European Court of Human Rights heard the application. The stay itself was controversial given the finding that continued treatment was contrary to Charlie's best interests. 6 The Strasbourg Court ruled by a majority that the application was inadmissible.
In July 2017, claims of fresh evidence from the US neurologist saw the case returned to the High Court. A declaration is not a court order, but rather a judicial opinion of what is in the child's best interests. In this case, however, the new evidence was not convincing and Francis J confirmed the declarations made in April. At this point, Chris Gard and Connie Yates no longer opposed the declarations. 7 They believed that earlier intervention would have given Charlie a chance to improve, but that window of opportunity had passed. The High Court was called upon one final time to rule on the various options for withdrawal of treatment in light of difficulty honouring 'If the treatment is not in his best interests, the court will not be able to give its consent on his behalf and it will follow that it will be lawful to withhold or withdraw it. Indeed, it will follow that it will not be lawful to give it.' 7
Re Gard (A Child) the parents' wish for Charlie to be ventilated at home for a number of days. 8 Charlie was moved to a hospice where he died on 28 July, aged 11 months.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES-FROM PROCESS TO SUBSTANCE
We lack the space to engage with many of the ethical issues the case raises. 9 Instead, we will follow the approach of the courts and confine our analysis to legal principle. Though we will focus on substantive law, there are five procedural issues we cannot ignore: first, the lack of legal aid for Charlie's parents is a travesty. 10 Francis J opined that a case where an National Health Service (NHS) Trust is applying for a declaration that life support be withdrawn is precisely the sort of case that should come within the scheme. 11 The commitment of lawyers representing Connie Yates and Chris Gard on a pro bono basis is remarkable.
The second issue is the unprecedented media involvement in the case. At one time, medical treatment disputes of this nature would have been held in camera. The decision by Connie Yates and Chris Gard to sacrifice anonymity was beneficial to their crowdfunding campaign. However, interviews, newspaper articles, the charliesfight.org media campaign and participation of Pope and President led to a mob mentality that put pressure on the judiciary, the staff at GOSH and the family. The GOSH legal team responded to misperceptions of the hospital's position and powers through increasingly detailed and emotive updates and position statements.
12 Threats and abuse perpetuated on both sides of the debate, and social media involvement poured fuel on the flames. It is lamentable that some of the commentary might have offered false hope to Charlie's family. Greater transparency might reduce the inaccuracies and misconceptions perpetuated. But extensive social media attention in cases involving young children also provokes concern around their privacy. 13 Thirdly, the case highlights uncertainties around the availability of unauthorised medicines for compassionate use. Drugs must be licensed before they can be marketed, 14 but novel therapies are made available through clinical trials, expanded access and compassionate use programmes, or on a named patient basis. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency launched an early access to medicines scheme in 2014, 15 and though the NHS rarely funds unproven treatment, the NHS 19 In Charlie's case, the only doctor giving evidence who did not believe that the prospect of benefit from the nucleoside treatment was 'effectively zero' was Professor Michio Hirano MD, from Columbia University, USA. 20 Whilst there was no suggestion in the judgments that Professor Hirano was motivated by anything but a desire to help Charlie and his parents, GOSH stated to the court on 24 July that 'it was concerned to hear the Professor state . . . that he retains a financial interest in some of the NBT compounds he proposed prescribing for Charlie'. 21 As the recent scandal involving Paolo Macchiarini demonstrates, 22 controls over access to innovative medicine are important to protect patients vulnerable to unsubstantiated promises of hope.
Fourthly, the use of mediation, whilst encouraged in professional guidance, 23 arguably requires more by way of facilitation. 24 It also raises questions about the scope of parental powers and rights which we will argue have varying force in the different arenas of the hospital and the courtroom. This is a substantive issue to which we shall return.
Finally, questions were raised over the jurisdiction of the court. 25 It was submitted that the court has no jurisdiction where a choice must be made between two viable treatment options. Whilst GOSH might refuse to deliver the nucleoside therapy, it could not, it was argued, prevent alternative arrangements for the therapy in the absence of proof of significant harm. As we shall see, the argument was rejected and the result was to limit parental rights to determine their child's best interests. 
PARENTAL RIGHTS
The scope of parental rights in determining the treatment outcome for their child was central to the case. In particular, Chris Gard and Connie Yates relied in the Court of Appeal on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to assert that the best interests test had been wrongly applied. Their argument was defeated, and we would suggest that to have decided otherwise would have perpetuated a line of reasoning that would frustrate progress in protecting children's rights.
The starting point is section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989, which dictates that the welfare of the child must be the paramount consideration. This is the guiding principle whether the decision is taken by parents, doctors, or the court. Section 3 of the Children Act 1989 sets out a definition of parental responsibility that counterbalances 'rights' and 'powers' with the 'responsibilities' owed to the child. Disputes between parents and medical professionals that cannot be resolved by mediation or otherwise must be determined by the court with respect to the welfare principle. In addressing the welfare of the child, the court considers what is in the child's best interests from the child's perspective. Whilst the parental view is a relevant consideration, the court is not obliged to act in accordance with the wishes of parents.
26
The argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to prevent the parents seeking viable alternative treatment was based on the premise that treatment would not cause Charlie 'significant harm'. It was argued that interference with the parental choice in these circumstances would be neither necessary nor proportionate and would, therefore, breach Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 27 The aim was not to challenge existing case law on the application of the best interests test, which clearly establishes that the reasonableness of the parental decision is not definitive.
28
Rather, counsel sought to establish a special category of cases on the basis that adherence to parental rights under Article 8 requires a distinct approach where they propose a viable treatment option that will not cause significant harm. 29 In seeking to establish this special category of cases, counsel for Charlie Gard's parents sought to rely on the High Court decision in Re Ashya King.
30 King concerned a choice between treatment options for a 5-year-old boy, Ashya, who suffered from medulloblastoma, a form of brain tumour. Granting Ashya's parents permission to take him to Prague for Proton Therapy, Baker J put considerable emphasis on the parental viewpoint:
It is a fundamental principle of family law in this jurisdiction that responsibility for making decisions about a child rest with his parents. In most cases, the parents are the best people to make decisions about a child and the State -whether it be the court, or any public authority -has no business interfering with the exercise of parental responsibility unless the child is suffering or is likely to suffer In the Gard case, McFarlane LJ in the Court of Appeal offered alternative readings of this passage. The first puts some strain on Baker J's dicta, attempting as it does to explain it on its facts as an example of the application of the best interests test. On this argument, there is no separate threshold of 'significant harm' where parents propose a viable treatment alternative. At the point at which the court in King was called upon to make a decision, the alternative options were considered equal in terms of their benefits and detriments and only for this reason were the parents free to make the choice. 32 As it was possible to accommodate either choice within the best interests test, the argument that King established a new category of cases is unfounded. In contrast, the options were not equal in Charlie Gard's case: it could not be established that the alternative treatment option in Charlie's case was viable.
McFarlane LJ gives an alternative and arguably more plausible reason for rejecting a separate threshold of 'significant harm'-namely, that Baker J had erred:
If, contrary to my primary reading, Mr Justice Baker did intend to state, where a parent puts forward a viable option for treatment, that the High Court only has jurisdiction to interfere with a parent's choice of that medical treatment if the child is likely to suffer significant harm as a result, then, in my view, such a statement has no foundation as a matter of law, is contrary to established authority and is therefore plainly in error. 33 The unproven nature of the treatment was given scant attention in King, 34 and concern has been expressed elsewhere that accommodating parental preferences for an option that is clinically suboptimal may stretch the boundaries of best interests. 35 As we have argued above, dicta supports the application of best interests from the child's rather than the adults' perspective. We welcome McFarlane LJ's firm rejection of a separate threshold of 'significant harm'. The Court of Appeal found that best interests is the 'established yardstick' 36 which should apply to all cases:
The judge decides what is in the best interests of the child by looking at the case entirely through eyes focused on the child's welfare and focused upon the merits and drawbacks of the particular options that are being presented to the court.
37
This is not to say that the parental view is not a relevant consideration in determining the child's welfare. many cases, all other things being equal, the views of the parents will be respected and are likely to be determinative.'
38 But McFarlane LJ also set out compelling reasons for caution:
[I]t is well recognised that parents in the appalling position that these and other parents can find themselves may lose their objectivity and be willing to "try anything", even if, when viewed objectively, their preferred option is not in a child's best interests. As the authorities . . . underline again and again, the sole principle is that the best interests of the child must prevail and that must apply even to cases where parents, for the best of motives, hold on to some alternative view.
39
VIABILITY OF UNPROVEN TREATMENT So far, we have considered and commended the court's application of the best interests test in preference to a test of significant harm. This section considers the relevance of the untested nature of nucleoside therapy and the impact this had on the perceived futility of treatment. The emphasis on the viability of nucleoside therapy flowed from the parental acknowledgement that Charlie's current quality of life was not worth extending, 40 and the fact that this was the only available alternative. 41 Francis J considered that treatment was not viable. One reason was the perceived irreversibility of Charlie's condition. A second, related reason was the negligible chance of improvement if treatment were successful. As Charlie deteriorated, his parents came to share this view but argued that: 'Had Charlie been given the treatment sooner he would have had the potential to be a normal healthy little boy.' 42 GOSH on the other hand, asserted that the therapy 'cannot and could not have assisted Charlie'. 43 A third reason was the possibility that Charlie was in pain 44 and that this pain might be significant. 45 Such was Charlie's quality of life, the courts found that it should not be sustained without the prospect of improvement: this prospect was not offered by nucleoside therapy which was considered 'futile'. 
Gard.
48 It identifies three sets of circumstances when withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment might be considered:
• If treatment is unable or unlikely to result in the child living much longer.
• Where treatment may prolong life but will cause the child unacceptable pain and suffering.
• If an older child with a life limiting illness repeatedly makes it clear they do not want treatment and this decision is supported by their parents and doctors.
More specifically, it advises that some children may be unable to derive benefit from treatment:
[T]he nature and severity of the child's underlying condition may make it difficult or impossible for them to enjoy the benefits that continued life brings. . . . Even in the absence of demonstrable pain or suffering, continuation of life sustaining treatment (LST) may not be in their best interests because it cannot provide overall benefit to them.
In the previous section, we argued that the parental view on the value of treatment is not determinative. Nor does science provide a definitive answer. As we shall see, best interests are widely construed and are not limited to clinical factors. Furthermore, the clinical factors themselves are often uncertain, changeable and challengeable. In the Gard decisions, the emphasis changes subtly from Professor Hirano's evidence that the chance of improvement offered by nucleoside therapy would be 'low but not zero'; 49 to Francis J's conclusion that the potential benefit would be 'as close to zero as makes no difference. In other words, as I have already said, it is futile'; 50 and then to McFarlane LJ's finding that the evidence of potential improvement is purely theoretical. 51 The issue was complicated by the unproven nature of the only available treatment. Three precedents provide guidance on the compatibility of unproven treatment with the best interests of an incompetent patient.
In Simms v Simms and An NHS Trust, 52 a new and untested intracerebral infusion was proposed by the parents of two young people who lacked competence to decide for themselves. The young people were suffering from variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, which is progressive and fatal. A Japanese Neuropathologist, Dr Doh-ura, had conducted research on animals that indicated the drug pentosan polysulphate might extend life expectancy, even if applied in the late stages of the disease. Two legal questions were raised. The first was whether a reasonable body of medical opinion would support administration of the therapy, as per the Bolam test. Dame Butler-Sloss acknowledged the difficulty of fulfilling this obligation when the therapy was untested and concluded that: 'The "Bolam test" ought not to be allowed to inhibit medical 48 Gard (n 3) [75] progress.'
53 So long as treatment was not clearly futile, it was Bolam-compliant. The second legal issue was whether the surgical procedure was in the young people's best interests. As in Gard, there was uncertainty around the benefits of therapy:
None of the medical witnesses entirely ruled out the possibility of some benefit. . . . Where there is no alternative treatment available and the disease is progressive and fatal, it seems to me to be reasonable to consider experimental treatment with unknown benefits and risks, but without significant risks of increased suffering to the patient, in cases where there is some chance of benefit to the patient. 54 The treatment would not lead to recovery, but Dame Butler-Sloss was satisfied that their lives were worth preserving and that 'any treatment that might be beneficial would be of value to them'. 55 The views of the family were accorded great weight.
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In An NHS Trust v J, 57 doctors proposed the administration of an innovative therapy to a patient, J, in a persistent vegetative state. Research papers had indicated that the drug Zolpidem, used to treat insomnia, might enhance J's awareness. The family opposed the treatment and sought withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition. If J's awareness was heightened, they felt, this would only enhance J's distress. Sir Mark Potter P accepted the expert opinion that a 3-day course of treatment was in J's best interests and ordered it to proceed. Was Bolam tacitly relevant here too? If a reasonable doctor would consider the treatment to be clinically viable, this offsets at least one potential constraint on compassionate use of unlicensed treatment. Another potential constraint is the best interests test and here the views of the family were considered but were not determinative.
Finally, in An NHS Trust v SR 58 a mother refused consent to standard postoperative treatment of medulloblastoma, arguing that alternative, non-conventional treatment was in her son, 7-year-old Neon Roberts', best interests. Declaring the conventional treatment proposed by the NHS trust lawful, Bodey J responded that:
The treatment proposed . . . would have to be (or should preferably be) properly studied, tested, reported on and peer-reviewed. . .. [T]he proposed plan would have to have a prognosis as to probable survival rate not much less than (and preferably equal to) the sort of survival rate achievable through the use of the orthodox treatment. 59 Thus, before unproven therapy can be sanctioned to treat a patient unable to provide consent, two hurdles must be overcome: the the High Court Gard decision, Francis J considered and distinguished Simms.
60 The futility and untested nature of the treatment could not be considered compatible with Charlie's best interests. The chance of improvement was not zero, but by the time the case reached the courts, nor was it seen as sufficient to justify prolonged treatment. Add to this the difficulties in establishing the reasonableness of treatment under the Bolam test and the decision, whilst heartbreaking for Charlie's family, was not only justifiable in law, but on the evidence, it was the only decision justifiable in law.
Since the Gard decision, another case sheds light on the compatibility of unproven treatment with a patient's best interests. B v D 61 involved a 27-year-old soldier who had suffered traumatic brain injury. The case was brought by his mother who sought stem cell treatment for D in Serbia, funded by a compensation payout. The treatment was unproven and not without risk, the chance of benefit was slim. 62 D's understanding of the treatment and its prospect of success was limited and he was found to lack capacity. Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires a decision to be taken in D's best interests. Welfare must be considered 'in the widest sense'
63 and this will often involve eliciting the views of family, 64 as well as the person's past and present wishes. 65 D's mother's view was, therefore relevant, but crucially, Mr Justice Baker was able to discuss the matter with D and establish that D wanted the treatment which he hoped would make him 'normal'. The Ministry of Defence and the Official Solicitor opposed the treatment, in part because they saw D's optimism regarding the unproven and unlicensed treatment's efficacy as evidence of a lack of understanding. Baker J, on the other hand, saw it 'more as an expression of the strength of his wish to have the treatment'. 66 Not having the treatment would adversely affect D's emotional welfare. Baker J recounted the words of Munby J: 'What good is it making someone safer if it merely makes them miserable?' 67 and asserted that: 'All life is an experiment'. The balance was fine, but subject to a number of conditions, the Court of Protection sanctioned the unproven treatment.
Notwithstanding our appreciation of the respect for the rights, will, and preferences of people lacking capacity, as required by Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, B v D is concerning. The cost to D's emotional welfare of not having the treatment might be as great if the treatment confirms expectations and proves inefficacious. 68 Moreover, it is difficult to align clinical evidence suggesting that the treatment lacks viability 69 and that the proposed treating clinic 'does not adhere to the international regulations that should be followed in these matters ', 70 with practice that accords with a responsible body of medical opinion. The judgment makes reference to neither Simms nor Bolam.
The case of B v D 71 deserves a commentary of its own. What is pertinent to the Gard decision is the distinction that can be drawn between cases where best interests can be determined in light of the patient's views and those where that is impossible. The legal regimes applying to adults and children lacking capacity have in common the requirement to view best interests from the patient's perspective.
72 B v D makes clear the potential weight of the patient's views. 73 Parents of very young children often know their child best and are, therefore, in an optimal position to speak to the child's emotional and sensory interests. To extend their relevance beyond this would take us ever closer to a substituted judgement test. A child-centred approach accommodates the views of parents, but does not substitute them for a best interest determination.
TEMPORAL BEST INTERESTS
Our preliminary conclusion that the court's decisions were in Charlie's best interests does not determine the question of whether or not an alternative decision might have been made by the hospital in accordance with both the Bolam test and the best interest principle. We submit that bringing a case to court subtly alters the way the best interests test is applied. 74 The hospital deals with a dynamic situation which alters with the fluctuating health of the patient, views of relevant parties and treatment options. Doctors serve as gatekeepers of best interests and the threshold for involving the court is high. In part, this flows from the resource implications of going to court and the stresses of having professional opinion held up to intense public scrutiny. It is also a result of the relevance to the wide best interests assessment of the patient's emotional and sensory interests, 75 which have potential to be adversely affected by legal dispute. In court, on the other hand, the ambits of the decision are framed by the declarations sought and the evidence available. 76 The court is not free to choose any decision it considers to be in the best interest of the patient. As we have argued, the role of judge is not one of mediator but protector of the child's best interests. Parental views do not hold just because they are reasonable or will not cause significant harm to the child. The result is that whilst the best interests test governs both the clinical and court setting, there are differences in its scope and application. This is not explicitly acknowledged in professional guidance. The General Medical Council exhorts doctors to 'always act in the best interests of children', but also acknowledges that 'identifying their best interests is not always easy. This is particularly the case in relation to treatment that does not have proven health benefits . . .'. 77 Vaccination policy provides an illustration of the different operation of best interests criteria in healthcare and judicial settings. Provided those with parental responsibility agree, they can decline to have their children vaccinated. And yet, vaccination disputes between those with parental responsibility have been resolved in favour of vaccination on the basis that it was in the best interests of the children concerned.
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It is arguable then that GOSH had greater scope than the court in determining best interests in a manner that was compatible with parental views. We would argue, however, that in this case the scope was not sufficient to justify acceding to the parents' wishes. Three arguments warrant consideration. First, with the benefit of hindsight, a trial of nucleoside therapy would arguably have been less detrimental to Charlie's interests than the months of delay that resulted from the legal dispute. But GOSH could only act on the available facts. Secondly, there is the argument that GOSH failed in its attempts at mediation. However, this was not a case offering a range of compromise positions, but a stark choice between two options: allow the unproven therapy or withdraw treatment and allow Charlie to die. 79 Thirdly, there is professional guidance suggesting that unproven treatment might have been considered in Charlie's case. Department of Health guidance 80 says this is appropriate when no alternatives exist, the disease is progressive and fatal, the risks minimal and there is some chance of benefit. This is questionable, however, in light of General Medical Council (GMC) guidance. 81 Good Medical Practice guidance states that doctors must 'be satisfied that the drugs or treatment serve the patient's needs' and must 'provide effective treatments based on the best available evidence'. 82 The Declaration of Helsinki too goes further than the Department of Health guidance:
In the treatment of an individual patient, where proven interventions do not exist or other known interventions have been ineffective, the physician, after seeking expert advice, with informed consent from the patient or a legally authorised representative, may use an unproven intervention if in the physician's judgement it offers hope of saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating suffering. This intervention should subsequently be made the object of research, designed to evaluate its safety and efficacy. In all cases, new information must be recorded and, where appropriate, made publicly available. 83 In Charlie's case, the evidence was that therapy did not offer 'hope of saving life, reestablishing health or alleviating suffering'. The hospital had strong grounds for supposing that the treatment would be unethical and contrary to established legal principle. Given the strain on relations between the parents and GOSH, one option would be to seek the advice of an ethics committee. The 2002 version of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences guidance recognised that some states require submission of cases for compassionate use to an ethics committee.
84 GOSH has an ethics committee but the Gard case was withdrawn when it became apparent that Charlie's health had deteriorated. Having ruled out this option, it was eminently appropriate that GOSH approached the court.
CONCLUSION
In decisions about life-sustaining treatment of a young child, best interests are determined neither by parents nor clinicians, but either through a hospital-based process of compromise and mediation, or a court-based judicial decision. In a hospital setting, the views of parents will often carry the day. Hospitals are keen to avoid court because their prioritisation of the child's best interests includes the emotional, sensory, and physical interests that legal dispute might compromise. Clinicians must be convinced that any harm to the child associated with contravening the wishes of parents are less impactful than the harm associated with accommodating their viewpoint. Once the case proceeds to court, the relevance of the parental view dwindles. It is relevant in determining the child's quality of life and insofar as the decision will impact on the engagement of the parent with the child and the effect this will have on the child's welfare, but because welfare cannot be determined by reference to the child's values, views, and wishes, clinical factors play a dominant role. 85 In many cases, particularly where parents are united, the progression of the case to court is indicative of an intractable dispute. Even then, as Mr Justice Francis was at pains to point out, mediation should be encouraged so that each fully understands the alternative viewpoint. 86 The costs associated with a breakdown in the relationship between clinicians and parents can be financial, emotional, and physical. Clinicians are, in a very real sense, mediators. Treatment is an enterprise that is dependent upon cooperation and this necessitates a relational approach. Whilst the duty to communicate with and consult parents is clear in both law 87 and ethics, 88 the waters are muddied by inconsistent ethical guidance on unproven, innovative treatment and latterly by inconsistencies in the legal approach. 89 In the Gard case, professional guidance from the GMC and Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health raised doubts as to the ethics of sanctioning the unproven therapy and in law it was questionable on existing legal precedent that it would satisfy either the best interests test or the Bolam standard of reasonable care. In light of this, mediation could not have focussed on finding a compromise, for there was no such middle path. Parents may know their children best, and their decision may be motivated by love, hope, and compassion, but that decision may still conflict with the best interests of the child. When dialogue failed, it was right and proper to ask the court to determine the issue. We have outlined discrepancies in professional guidelines on access to innovative treatment, resolution of which might assist parties in articulating and applying risk-benefit analysis. We have also argued that clinical ethics committees are well served to balance the ethical tensions between parental autonomy, harm prevention, and beneficence and that their independence and distance from the issue are relevant mediation credentials.
The decision fell to the courts to resolve and at this point the framing and application of best interests was constrained by the available evidence and the declarations sought by GOSH. Judges are not mediators, but are instead constrained by the dominant principle of best interests and the requirement to consider the test from the child's point of view. Gard was a test case for a new recognition of parental rights, albeit in the limited situation where parents pose a treatment alternative unlikely to cause the child significant harm. The rejection of this argument was an unmitigated blow to Chris Gard and Connie Yates, but we have argued that the principle it upholds-namely the elevation of the child's interests above the parents'-gives some cause for optimism. It is a very muted victory given its desperately sad outcome. 
